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If any sense modality represents the world, vision does. But argu-
ment is needed to show that smell does; it has never been obvious
that smell represents. This paper rebuts two reasons for doubt-
ing that smell represents, and offers several arguments that it
does. The paper then considers several recent proposals as to
exactly what a smell represents, and defends a version of my older
proposal—that a smell represents a miasma in the air—against its
competitors, though offering a concession or two.
In the next section I shall expound the main reasons for which
people have denied representational status to smell. But first, I
must say more precisely which of several possible things I mean
by “smell.” The word could mean, (i) olfactory experience as some
writers put the question, (ii) smelling, whether “experienced” (i.e.,
consciously) or not1, or (iii) the olfactory system as investigated by
cognitive and neuroscientists. I shall try to mean (ii). (iii) Would
be an entirely empirical matter, though obviously scientific results
regarding the olfactory system bear fairly directly on our own
issue. Moreover, it is possible that the olfactory system subperson-
ally represents properties that are not smelled by the whole person
whose olfactory system it is. (i) seems needlessly restrictive, since
(according to me) the difference between a type of mental state
occurring non-consciously and that same type of state occurring
consciously is superficial, a matter of whether the state is itself
represented by a higher-order state (Lycan, 1996, 1998, 2004);
it would not normally affect the state’s own representational
content.
So my opening question more precisely is, are worldly proper-
ties or things represented in and/or by person-level smelling? And
as noted, I begin with the negative view.
THE CASE AGAINST
(1) There are two main reasons for doubting that smell (in
particular) represents. First, if we focus introspectively on the
specifically sensory character of an olfactory experience, we detect
1Some writers use “experience” liberally, to include all cases of perceiving
whether conscious or not. I prefer to reserve the term for sensing consciously,
i.e., for sensings of which their subjects are aware.
only that modification of our consciousness, the qualitative con-
dition or event in us. Even if we infer the presence of horses from
their characteristic smell, the smell does not itself present horses
as its own representatum.We infer horses only because we already
know from experience that that smell is typically produced by
horses. (The overall phenomenology perhaps suggests otherwise:
we just smell horses and notice no inference. But again, the smell
has to have been associated empirically with horses; if you experi-
enced it having never made that association, it would say nothing
to you2.)
Second, were you to experience a smell that represents X when
no X is present, you would be misrepresenting, smelling falsely or
incorrectly. But this does not seem to happen. There used to be a
distinctive way in which a new American car smelled from the
inside. Then someone manufactured an aerosol that replicated
the new-car smell. You could buy it in auto parts stores; I think it
was actually called “new-car smell.” Suppose a friend had used the
fake and given you a ride. The car smelled new to you even though
it was several years old. This is misrepresenting of some sort, but
it is not incorrect smelling. The nose itself was not fooled, for the
new-car odor was really there and causing the smell experience in
the normal way; the car’s inside did have the new-car smell even
though it is not a new car.
We characterize smells by reference to their normal environ-
mental causes: horses, new cars; the smells of roses, natural gas3,
2“Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them, printing their proud hoofs
i’ the receiving earth.” Despite the point about empirical association, a more
immediate way to imagine them is through their smell.
An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that vision too requires empiri-
cal association. If I am acquainted with horses only through the sounds they
make, but then for the first time I come upon a field containing horses, cows,
and ostriches, vision will not tell me which of the animals are horses. It is con-
troversial whether vision ever represents natural kinds. Siegel (2010) argues
that it does; for discussion, see Lycan (2014). It is not very controversial that
vision does represent, but there are a few opponents, e.g., Campbell (2002).
3Such characterizations can be tricky in particular cases. Natural gas itself con-
sists largely of methane (CH4), and is odorless. What we commonly call the
smell “of gas” is actually that of a pungent odorant added by the gas company
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boiled spinach, locker rooms. But it does not follow that those
causes are represented by the smells, because they can be coun-
terfeited by other substances. Again, the point is not that we can
misrepresent them; that would hardly show that they are not rep-
resentata. Rather, in a counterfeit case the nose is not fooled,
and the smell itself is not misrepresenting, even though we may
form a false belief; and nothing yet has shown that we smell cor-
rectly either. (Conversely, of course, if you experience the locker
room smell when you are not in a locker room, you are not
smelling correctly, but it does not follow that you are smelling
incorrectly 4.)
Nor do phenomenal smells represent, as some Gibsonians
would have it, broader ecologically significant properties of
things, for the same reason and for others5. Thus, it is tempting
to conclude that smells merely accompany external objects with a
fair degree of type–type reliability, but do not represent them.
REBUTTAL
(2) That is the case against smell’s representing. It is not a very
strong case. Vs. the first argument: Though introspection does
seem to reveal that vision represents, its failure to do that for smell
hardly shows that smell does not represent. Introspection is a
blunt instrument, and cannot in general be relied on to determine
whether a mental state has representational content. Witness the
fact that philosophers disagree on such questions, despite being
roughly equal in introspective competence. Further, though some
mental states traditionally have not been thought to represent,
there has been increasing consensus that those states do have
some representational structure even though that is not function-
ally the most important thing about them and, more to the point,
even though their representational structure does not leap out in
introspection: pain; some of the emotions6.
The second argument fails because there is no reason to
assume that if smells represent at all, they represent the envi-
ronmental causes by which we casually characterize them. As
we shall see, there are several other candidates for representata.
(I say no reason to assume; this is not to deny that a theory of
in order that an otherwise fatal gas leak will be readily apparent; the connec-
tion between the adulterant and the gas itself is entirely conventional. So the
smell “of gas” is not that of gas, but of the chemically unrelated odorant.
4The point holds even of smells that purport to identify individual things,
such as the competent dog’s master-indicating smell. Although for a dog the
smell of an individual human being may be unique in fact, it is still true that
were another human being to duplicate the dog’s master’s particular smell,
and the dog were to smell that smell and expect master, the dog would not be
mistaken in smelling it, on something else that did smell the same way, even
though the dog’s ensuing expectation would be false.
Here too (cf. fn 2, and thanks to the same reviewer) there is a visual analog.
The interior of an old car may have been freshly painted and detailed, causing
you to believe that the car is new, but the eyes themselves are not fooled. It
seems to me very unlikely that vision represents so sophisticated a category
as “new car” (on this, see again Lycan, 2014). But here too, it is not widely
doubted that vision does represent.
5See Ch. 3 of Perkins (1983).
6Pain: Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1970), Tye (1995, 2005), Crane (2003), Hill
(2005). Emotions: Prinz (2004). Lycan (1996) argues that even the vaguest
moods, such as “free-floating” anxiety, depression, and general optimism,
have definite though comparatively uninteresting representational content.
Vivat Brentano.
representation7 for smell might invoke such causes, though the
second argument would itself count against such a theory8.) And
now I shall argue positively that smell does represent.
THE THESIS
(3) Consider that a main function of any sense modality is
feature detection, the registering of environmental properties. It
does not follow that the relevant sensory states represent those
properties—at least not without addition of the dubious premise
“If a state has the function of detecting feature F, the state repre-
sents F”—but I and others have argued positively that smell does
represent. I claim that a smell actually has semantical properties:
reference, a truth- and/or satisfaction-condition. A smell can be
treated formally, álaHintikka, as a function from possible worlds
to truth-values, and any such function corresponds to a propo-
sition expressed9. A smell can be incorrect, a misrepresentation.
If these perhaps surprising things are true, then surely smells are
indeed representations.
And I believe they are true. It may seem that, phenomenally
speaking, a smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a
qualitative condition in us, lingering uselessly in the mind with-
out representing anything. And as noted, disinclination to think
of smells as representations increases when we ask what they
might be representations of. If the “smell of roses” represented
roses, then it would be true or satisfied or correctly tokened only
in response to roses, false or incorrect otherwise; and it would
determine a function that, given a world, spit out exactly the set
of roses at that world. The rose smell does neither of those things.
Yet, as I have observed, there are other candidates for external
representatum.
For one, consider what an odor is, in one public sense of the
term. It is a miasma in the air, a vaporous emanation, a diffusing
collection of molecules typically given off from a definite physical
source. It is itself a determinate physical thing, distinct from its
source object, thatmakes physical contact with the smell receptors
in one’s olfactory epithelium and sets them to firing. We are pub-
licly, commonsensically and often mutually aware of such odors;
they are public physical entities available for sensing by anyone
who happens by. Now, an odor is a candidate for representatum,
and the idea of an odor as an intentional object of smell resists
the objection I have made to the more colloquial candidates. For
things other than roses can give off the odor “of roses,” and roses
can fail to give off that odor. (Again, I am talking only about the
match in the physical world between types of object and types of
odor.) Perhaps, then, smells represent odors10.
7A “psychosemantics,” to the philosophers.
8In sec. 10 below I shall allow that the normal environmental causes may be
represented by smell experiences, albeit in an indirect way.
9This is a standard account of the propositional meanings of natural-language
sentences. E.g., “There is a moose in Caldwell Hall” is false in our actual world,
but is true in some other possible worlds; the function from worlds to truth-
values represents the range of circumstances under which that sentence would
be true.
10If smells represent odors (or any other external phenomenon), it is open to
one who holds the Representational theory of sensory qualities—“qualia” in
one of that mutilated term’s many senses—to identify those qualities inher-
ing in smell experiences with the relevant representata. (According to the
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But why think that, even so? Perhaps, to the contrary, all there
is to the relation is that smells are highly but imperfectly corre-
lated with odors, and that is not enough to make for a case of
representing.
THE CASE FOR
(4) Actually there are several positive arguments for award-
ing representational status to smell, now that the main objections
have been circumvented. A first is that once smells are correlated
with odors rather than with types of object, a kind of incorrect-
ness does manifest itself, hence a correctness- or truth-condition.
If I hallucinate a rose smell in the absence of any rose or any-
thing else that is giving off the rose odor, I am misperceiving. The
point is not just that my belief that a rose is present is erroneous.
I may not even have that belief, knowing full well that my olfac-
tory experience is hallucinatory. Something is perceptually wrong;
my olfactory bulb is saying “Rose odor” when there is no rose
odor physically present, and that report is a lie. Where there is
falsehood there is representation.
[Of course this can be resisted. One can grant that a detec-
tor or indicator is registering a false positive without being forced
to admit full-bore representation, if one wishes to place further
conditions on what it takes for something to be a genuine rep-
resentation (cf. Ramsey, 2007)]. My claim for this first argument
is only that smell has a possibly unreal, non-actual representa-
tum in at least the rudimentary sense that detectors and indicators
have representata. However, I would add that smell’s strong and
multifarious functional connections to memory and other cog-
nitive agencies suggest a stronger representational connection
as well.]
(5) Richardson (2013) persuasively attacks the phenomeno-
logical view on which our first anti-representationalist argument
was based (section 1 above), that “considered only phenomeno-
logically, a smell seems a modification of our own consciousness
rather than a property of a perceptual object that would exist
unperceived” (p. 406, quoted from Lycan, 2000, p. 277). She
argues to the contrary that smell, like vision, is “exteroceptive,”
i.e., that even phenomenologically, the sensible qualities inhering
in a smell sensation “seem . . . to be qualities of objects distinct
from our bodies” (p. 405), the “objects” for the case of smell
being odors, and the seeming is not just a matter of cognitive
Representational theory more generally, any sensory quality such as a color,
pitch, taste, or texture is, veridically or not, being represented as a feature of
something in the environment. For example, if I have a yellow patch in my
visual field occasioned by seeing a lemon, the mental yellowness is just that
of the external lemon, represented by the visual system in the experience. If I
hallucinate a similar lemon, the mental yellowness is still just that of the now
non-actual external lemon, non-veridically represented in the experience.)
I myself do hold the Representational theory and do so identify subjective
smell qualities with properties of external odors (Lycan, 1987, 1996), but I
also insist that the overall phenomenal character of a smell experience out-
runs the experience’s representational content, because the specifically sensory
quality in question is only a proper component of the overall phenomenology
(Lycan, 1998). The main dialectical connection between the present paper and
the Representational theory, then, is this: If I am wrong here and smell expe-
riences do not represent, then either the Representational theory is false or,
surprisingly, smell experiences do not feature sensory qualities at all.
association11. Exteroceptivity is also connected to finding out: “In
exteroceptive experience we find out about the [relevant] qualities
of objects . . . by their seeming to have the qualities in question” (p.
406). Richardson carefully makes the case that olfactory experi-
ence is exteroceptive despite its lack of vision-like spatial features.
I am persuaded that she is right.
N.b., exteroceptivity does not entail representation; it is phe-
nomenological only. (Nor does Richardson claim that smell rep-
resents.) But this gap can be bridged using a type of argument
deployed by Byrne (2001) on behalf of the Representational the-
ory of sensory qualities (see again note 9; cf. also Thau, 2002).
He appeals precisely to the notion of seeming: “if the way the
world seems to [a subject] hasn’t changed, then it can’t be that
the phenomenal character of his experience has changed” (p.
207). Suppose a subject has two consecutive experiences that dif-
fer in phenomenal character, i.e., in how they subjectively feel to
her. If she notices the change in phenomenal character, Byrne
argues, the way things seem to her when she has the second
experience must differ from the way they seemed to her while
she was having the first. For suppose that consecutive experi-
ences are the same in content. Then the world seems exactly the
same to the subject during both. She “has no basis for” notic-
ing a change in phenomenal character either, and by the previous
premise it follows that there was no change in phenomenal char-
acter (p. 211). Byrne concludes that experiences cannot differ
in phenomenal character without differing in representational
content12.
Thus, if a subject’s phenomenology changes merely by the
addition of an olfactory component, there must have been a
change in representational content, and the obvious candidate is
the addition of an olfactory representatum.
(6) A further argument can be adapted to the purpose from
one of Moreland Perkins’ (1983, p. 63ff). Perkins points out that
when we sniff an object and for the first time perceive its odor,
we find out something about the object. What we find out is,
seemingly, its odor. Now according to the view I have expounded
earlier, odor is just a physical diffusion of relevantly shaped par-
ticles in the air. But, Perkins argues, what I find out when I “find
out the object’s odor” is not (per se) anything about a physical dif-
fusion of relevantly shaped particles in the air. Rather, to find out
the odor in the relevant sense is to find out what the odor is like
to smell.
“Like” in that last formula, as in the phrase “smells like,”
does not mean resemblance. In Perkins’ Farrell-Nagelian sense,
one can find out and know what a new odor smells like with-
out there being anything in one’s previous experience that
it resembles. Perhaps we would do better to speak of find-
ing out how the odor smells; “It smells like this” and “It
smells this way” do not seem to differ in meaning. How the
odor smells is something that one can know only if one has
either actually smelled it or has smelled something sufficiently
11“This castle hath a pleasant seat. The air nimbly and sweetly recommends
itself unto our gentle senses.”
12For the record, I reject that blanket conclusion; see footnote 10. But we can
understand Byrne as using the term fairly narrowly, excluding, e.g., conative
and affective features of the experience.
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similar that one can be told by comparison how the first odor
smells.
I shall break off at this point in Perkins’ line of reasoning
(which is actually a long defense of a version of a none too clear
doctrine he calls “Indirect Realism”), for it is all I need as a foun-
dation for my own argument. Much to the alarm of all, however,
I shall start off in my own direction by noting that one could
know all the objective scientific facts there are—about a physical
odor, its effect on the olfactory epithelium, the ensuing excitations
in the bulbs, and all further results in the thalamus, the neocor-
tex, the limbic system and so on at any length—without knowing
what the odor smelled like (how it smelled).—Please, stay calm.
I am not about to invoke Leibniz’ Law and infer that there is a
fact left out which eludes all of science and which philosophi-
cal materialists feloniously ignore. Not even Leibniz’ God would
have the power tomake that follow, for it simply does not follow13.
However, we do have tomake sense of the admittedly odd fact that
I can know that P and fail to know that Q even when the fact that
P just is the fact that Q on a suitably coarse-grained individuation
policy for “facts.”14
I can know that I have salted a tomato without knowing that I
have put NaCl on it, even though the fact of my salting it is one
and the same as the fact of my putting NaCl on it. That is because
what is the very same substance, salt or NaCl, can be represented
by me in each of two psychologically inequivalent ways. Knowing
is hyperintensional; if you like, its object is not just a fact but a
fact under a particular representation.
As is painfully well-known, this hyperintensionality is similarly
manifested by mind-brain identities. Suppose for rude simplic-
ity that pain is simply the firing of X-fibers. Even if that were
so, I could know that I was in pain without knowing anything
about X-fibers, and I could know physiologically all about X-
fiber firings without knowing what it is like to feel pain, if I have
never felt it myself (had my own X-fibers firing). This is possible,
again, so long as the same fact is represented in two psycholog-
ically inequivalent ways. The fact, of the pain or (indifferently)
the firings, can be represented in a public way, in physiological
terms, as well as by the use of the English word “pain.” But much
more commonly it is represented introspectively by its owner—
for short, it is felt. One can know all the publicly accessible facts
about pain without knowing what pain feels like so long as one
has not introspected any pain oneself. One comes to learn what it
feels like when one first does introspect it, when one thus begins
to represent it in a first-person way.
So with smell. I can know all the chemistry of a rose, the
physical properties of the rose odor, the neurophysiology etc.
of olfaction and all the other scientific facts about smell with-
out knowing how the rose odor smells. But how the rose odor
smells, or what it smells like, just is the complex of fact I have
13That and why it does not follow has been explained at length by so many
writers in philosophy of mind that it would be tedious even to begin naming
them.
14One can of course hold out for a finer-grained individuation policy, as rec-
ommended by Chisholm (1976). But that policy proliferates “leftover facts”
everywhere, not just in the philosophy of mind. On this issue in particular, see
Lycan (2003).
just mentioned, which by hypothesis I do know. The appearance
of contradiction can be resolved just as in the case of pain, and
(more to the point for my argument) I do not see any other
way of resolving it: I can know the complex of osphresiologi-
cal fact without knowing how the rose smells because knowing
is knowing-under-a-representation, and the same fact can be
known under one representation but not under another. Here,
I know the facts under their textbook descriptions; what I fail to
do until I have smelt a rose is to know them under their intro-
spective descriptions, their first-person representations supplied
by my introspector. I will come to know what the rose odor smells
like only when I do represent it introspectively, that is, when I
smell it. That is how the Farrell-Nagel puzzle is resolved. And that
solution entails that olfactory experience involves representation.
However, a gap remains: I have so far ignored a complication
needed to make the smell story truly parallel to the case of pain.
There are really two tiers of representation. The rose odor causes
an olfactory sensation, a smell, which represents it, and that sen-
sation is in turn represented by my introspector—an attention
mechanism—when I concentrate on the sensation’s phenomenal
character. (If I never do attend to the smell-sensation, if my intro-
spector happens never to be directed upon it, then I will never
be consciously aware of the sensation; cf. unfelt pain. This pic-
ture is defended at length in Lycan, 1996). Now, someone might
ask, though the present Nagelian argument does require that the
introspector’s output be a representation, why should we believe
that its representatum, the first-order smell sensation, itself rep-
resents the physical odor? Perhaps it is merely caused by the odor
before being represented by the introspector. I reply, again follow-
ing Perkins, that according to common sense and parlance, what
we come to know when we attend to the smell of our first rose
is what the rose odor smells like (and derivatively what the rose
itself smells like), not just what it feels like to have the smell sen-
sation that happens to have resulted from contact with the odor;
as Perkins said, we find out something about the odor, viz. how it
smells. I see no reason not to take common parlance at face value
here, and accept that the smell sensation ascribes a sensory quality
to the odor itself 15.
(7) The picture I have presented yields an explanation of a fur-
ther phenomenon: the ineffability of smell, the fact that smells
(and odors) can be described in words only by comparison to
other smells (and odors) or by reference to their external causes.
For my internal representation of an odor is a lexeme of a private
language, the medium of representation in which my introspec-
tor makes its reports. That lexeme has any number of co-referring
descriptions framed in public natural languages, but (for reasons
emphasized in Lycan, 1996) no such description that shares its
15There is a perennial problem, much discussed in the “self-knowledge” lit-
erature, of how an introspective representation of a first-order mental state
represents the latter state’s own representatum in particular. But that problem
is everyone’s, or at least afflicts any view that posits higher-order representa-
tion of a state that is itself representational. It is not a special objection to the
present argument.
To pursue the analogy with pain: When I first felt the pain I now have in my
left shoulder socket, did I find out anything about my shoulder? I believe so. I
found out that there is damage or some other physical disorder in it—which
belief was then confirmed by X-rays.
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meaning. Nothing equivalent can be said in English (though of
course we could introduce a public word—“samantha”—and try
contra Wittgenstein to stipulate that it is to be synonymous with
my introspective term)16.
Recently it has been suggested that the ineffability thesis has
been exaggerated and that cross-cultural data refute or at least
impugn it. Majid and Burenhult (2014)17 investigated a claim
they express variously: that “the experience of a smell is impos-
sible to put into words” (abstract, p. 266); that “people find it
difficult, if not impossible, to name odors” (p. 266); that “people
universally struggle to describe odors” (p. 269). These things may
be true of Anglo-Americans and others from “Western Educated
Industrialized Rich Democratic communities” (p. 267), but they
are not true of some less urban and industrialized peoples. In
particular, Majid and Burenhult studied the Jahai, a nomadic
hunter-gatherer tribe on the Malaysian peninsula, and found that
they have a very rich lexicon of odor terms, comparable to their
color vocabulary.
But those results do not bear on my own still pretty tradi-
tional ineffability thesis. The claim is not that we cannot name or
identify or classify odors—though we Anglo-Americans cannot
as well as the Jahai do. Majid and Burenhult’s first formulation
comes closest to it (“the experience of a smell is impossible to put
into words”), the operative term being “experience”: The claim is
that once we do have a subjective smell all named and identified
and classified, then if we are asked “But what is it like in itself to
experience that smell [so named, identified and classified],” we go
tongue-tied.
Doubtless the foregoing case for smell’s representational
status could be resisted by a sufficiently determined anti-
representationalist, and we know they are out there. But I believe
it is a strong case, and, importantly, it militates against selective
anti-representationalism. That is, it makes it hard for a theorist
to admit that vision and perhaps hearing represent but deny that
smell does.
I return to the question of what smell represents. My position
to date has been that it represents odors in the sense of particulate
miasmas in the air, but in recent years differing proposals have
been offered.
WHAT DOES IT REPRESENT?
(8) Vision ostensibly represents things or objects and ascribes
properties to those things. Batty (2010) asks whether an olfac-
tory experience does the same. Introspection cannot settle that
question. Instead, Batty first appeals to the fact that there are
no known olfactory illusions (as opposed to hallucinations), i.e.,
cases in which a real object is perceived as having a property that
it does not have18. Second, she observes that there is no obvious
16For much more detail and defense of all this, see again Lycan (1996).
Austen Clark (1993) speaks of a transparent/opaque ambiguity in phrases
like “lilacs odor.” Taken transparently or de re, the latter phrase must refer to
what some lilacs are up to, regardless of the smell sensation produced. On its
opaque use, it describes the qualitative character of an olfactory experience
regardless of what is going on in the environment.
17Thanks to a reviewer and to Bence Nanay for bringing this literature to my
attention.
18Most philosophers have accepted this, but the psychologist R. J.
Stevenson (2011) does not. He cites a number of empirical studies
Many-Property Problem (Jackson, 1977) for smell19. Third, she
argues that smell per se is not spatial, and so cannot (alone) iden-
tify a worldly object spatially; nor is there any other means of
doing so20.
On their face, these points would suggest that smell does not
represent in the first place. It may once again now seem that
“olfactory experiences are mere smudges on our consciousness”
(p. 518). But Batty does not accept the points as showing that,
for as she rightly says, having representational content does not
entail representing particulars and ascribing properties to them21.
Rather, she suggests that smell represents properties “abstractly,”
as merely existentially quantified: There is F-ness here (where
“here” means only something like, present to me22.) What in fact
makes such a quantificational content true is something in the
air—something we know on other grounds to be an odor—but
that is itself no part of the bare representational content.
I am not sure how much disagreement there is between Batty’s
“abstract” theory and my (1996) view. The latter certainly did not
entail that smell represents odor particulars in the way that vision
(allegedly) can. It does entail that smell represents odor univer-
sals. Disagreement depends on detail. As her leading example (p.
530), Batty offers “∃x(x is smoky, lavendery & at L0,” where L0
is the default ambient location for all smells and “smoky” and
“lavendery” are counterparts of the color and shape predicates
that would figure in a parallel “abstract” visual representation.
If “smoky” and “lavendery” are being used as adjectives, then
as Batty seems to intend, the semantics is blind to x; x is an I-
know-not-what that nonetheless smokyizes and lavenderizes. But
if the “is” is that of instancehood, “smoky” and “lavendery” can
be taken as kind terms, and the representation can be read as,
“There is some smoky and some lavendery at L0.” (We know,
(cf. Wilson and Stevenson, 2006) in which are shown mismatches between
olfactory percepts and the stimuli that caused them. Batty (2014) does not
dispute the data, but argues that such mismatches do not rise to the level of
illusion intended by the philosophers.
19That problem was an objection raised by Frank Jackson against “adverbial”
theories and others that tried to avoid commitment to individual phenomenal
things’ figuring in a subject’s phenomenal field. A visual field, for example,
cannot be described simply by means of a list of color properties and shape
properties such as {blue, red, circle, triangle}, because that list alone would
not distinguish a field containing a blue circle and a red triangle from one
containing a blue triangle and a red circle. Even phenomenally, colors and
shapes group into individual objects.
Batty’s point goes back to Clark (2000) and Smith (2002).
20In such arguments she follows Smith (2002) and Matthen (2005).
21Later in her paper (pp. 513–514) she does offer two quick arguments for the
claim that smell represents, without supposing they are decisive: Each is an
instance of what she calls the Unification Thesis: that “certain philosophical
issues about perception should be settled in the same way for each of the sense
modalities.” (1) All senses function as informational systems. “As guides of
behavior and grounds of belief, the experiences of the sense modalities form
a common kind.” (2) In particular, since some animals’ olfactory experiences
“are for them as vision is for us,” in that they are clearly “world-directed” and
help the animals map the world, then if our visual experiences are represen-
tational, so are their olfactory experiences; and if their olfactory experiences
represent, then so do ours however less richly.
22Richardson rightly urges that the location is more specific: present to
my nose. This distinguishes odor from, e.g., ambient temperature, where
temperature is perceived as being “around me” more generally.
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as the natural-kind semantics does not, that smoky and laven-
dery are really odors, i.e., miasmas in the air.) It is this second
interpretation that is hard to distinguish from my view.
The adjectival interpretation invites the question of what prop-
erties smokiness and lavenderiness are, given that they are prop-
erties of odors rather than odors themselves. Perhaps they are
response-dependent relations between odors and perceivers. But
this would raise problems of the sort that bedevil dispositional
theories of color, and Batty has not (at least not here) supplied
motivation for doing so.
The natural-kind interpretation forces a question for Batty
about entailment: Does “There is some smoky and some laven-
dery at L0” entail both “There is some smoky at L0” and “There is
some lavendery at L0”? If it does, I see little difference between her
view and mine. If it does not, we need to hear more about how
to parse her formula, “∃x(x is smoky, lavendery & at L0.” What
would be the relation between “smoky, lavendery,” “smoky,” and
“lavendery?”
(9) Young (2013) challenges the odor theory, at least a strong
and distinctive form of it. His main complaint is that existing
odor theories have either implied identity and individuation con-
ditions for smells, which conditions are untenable, or they have
been sullenly silent on identity and individuation and therefore
need filling out by tenable conditions. On the first horn of that
dilemma, his paradigm seems to be the Platonic idea that an odor
is an emanation of “detached proper parts of ordinary objects”
(p. 3). That idea explains some of the phenomena noted in sec-
tion 1 above, such as the veridicality of a smell even though the
source object is itself long gone. But, Young argues persuasively,
smells do not always track their source objects or even (at the level
of types) their usual or typical source objects.
Of course, odor-theory phrases like “a miasma in the air”
do not commit us odor theorists to the Platonic source-object
thesis, but that is because they are vague. Young demands that
we be able to tell him what types of miasmata, exactly, pro-
duce which smells. Why, for example, does a particular synthetic
chemical compound have the same olfactory quality as a rose
(p. 7)? He offers a proposal that he defends by appeal to a good
deal of empirical literature. (He is willing to call the proposal
a “modulation of” the odor theory.) The proposal is to iden-
tify olfactory objects, not with molecular compounds, but with
“the three-dimensional chemical structures of molecules” (p. 21),
“actual three-dimensional structures formed by their constituent
functional groups and their placement in space and time.”
If I understand Young correctly, the main contrast between
this Molecular Structure theory and “the Odor theory” (now
capitalized) is that it appeals to “micro-objects derived from the
structure of matter” rather than to merely small bits of a source
object (p. 27). If “the Odor theory” is thus characterized, I believe
Young wins and anyone who holds it should stop doing so. But I
know of no one who does hold it as such; I and the other odor
theorists whom I have read fall on the other horn of his dilemma,
simply not having said enough about the relevant “miasma” to be
tested against the science.
Nor am I nearly knowledgeable enough to contest his assess-
ment of the empirical findings. If the operative elements of
what hangs in the air are situated three-dimensional molecular
structures, so be it, and I provisionally accept the friendly precisi-
fication. But I have one comparatively a priori worry about it.
Young grants (section 4.2) that a synthetic odorant that mim-
ics the smell of a natural object may differ from that object in
molecular structure. Does this not create a problem of metamers?
For predictive purposes, he need furnish only bottom-up suffi-
ciencies, and his theory will succeed by his lights if he is able to
predict that structure A will trigger a rose smell, and so will struc-
ture B and so will structure C. But our own question was, exactly
what does the “rose smell” represent? In the face of metamers, is it
now ambiguous as between three different representata, A, B, and
C (and however many more synthetics the future might reveal),
so that it will differ contextually in accuracy condition?
It is tempting to look for a more abstract, higher-level property
that is being implemented by A, B, and C; but Young explicitly
rejects that move (p. 27). Yet the ambiguity view is an extreme
form of externalism, and though generally an externalist myself,
I do not think perceptual representation in particular should be
so fraught. As a friendly retreat from Young’s friendly precisifica-
tion, I offer the analog of my own view of color metamers (Lycan
(1996); not that I think Young would welcome it)23.
The view construes color representata as physical properties
of objects, but only as very modest ones. They are roughly the
properties that constitute the objects’ dispositions to produce
the corresponding sensations in normal sentient observers under
normal viewing conditions; and as we all know, those properties
are an unruly, rough, and ragged lot. Certainly they form no natu-
ral kind at the level of physics or chemistry. A physical color, then,
is taken to be a pathetically disjunctive microstructural property
of objects. It is of interest only because of its relation to the human
visual system.
The latter fact seems damning: “(1) You pick out the ‘property’
in question only by reference to the human visual system. And in
fact, (2) all ‘its’ instances have in common is that they do produce
the relevant sensations in people. Moreover (3) you have admit-
ted that it constitutes its subject’s disposition to produce such
sensations. For these reasons, the property you’re talking about
is just that of being disposed to cause people to sense in the corre-
sponding way.”We had been trying to explicate phenomenal color
as a matter of representing worldly color, but now we are tac-
itly understanding “worldly color” in terms of the phenomenal;
circular and viciously so.
But the foregoing argument is a bad one. As admitted, the kind
of property I am talking about is ontologically and scientifically
ugly; but not even the conjunction of the premises (1)–(3) jus-
tifies the argument’s conclusion. Despite its ugliness, my sort of
property inheres in an object on its own; regardless of how it is
picked out or identified byme or anyone else, regardless of its ever
producing sensations in anyone (or being detected by any being
at all), and, surprisingly, regardless of its actually constituting a
disposition to produce sensations in anything. For in principle it
can be specified or defined independently of its doing any of those
things. It is as it is, whether or not anyone identifies it or refers to
it, whether or not it ever produces sensations of any sort, whether
23It is inspired by if not just swiped from Armstrong (1984, pp. 170–182; also
1987).
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or not it constitutes any disposition, and even if none of those
things were true.
If this view, unsatisfying as may be, is nonetheless correct,
it can be extrapolated to the problem of smell metamers. What
a smell represents is then a (probably open-ended) disjunctive
property—the property that serves as the categorical basis of an
odor’s being disposed to cause the corresponding smell sensations
in humans, but not (metaphysically) because it so serves. This
removes the threat of multiply ambiguous reference, at the cost
of positing a single referent that is in its own metaphysical right
ugly and misshapen.
LAYERING?
(10) One may tentatively suppose, then, that phenomenal
smells represent odors in the sense I have tried to specify. But (in
conversation) Ruth Millikan has contended against me that my
arguments and others’ against the idea that smells represent envi-
ronmental objects must be flawed. If we are to agree with anything
like her pleasantly Panglossian evolutionary-historical account of
representational content (Millikan, 1989, 1995), we must suppose
that if smells do represent anything, they do after all represent
environmental objects of potential adaptive significance. Surely
that is what olfaction is for, to signal food, predators, shelter,
mates, and other objects of interest ultimately derivative from
those; and signaling is at least a crude form of representing.
I am inclined to think Millikan is right about that (bar “if
smells do represent anything”). And there is further pressure to
expand the field of representata and make it still more distal:
Phenomenologically, it seems that we do smell roses, horses, and
even individual things or people.
But these two considerations do not force me to abandon my
claim that smells represent odors. Even if I accept them both, I
suggest that smells represent adaptively significant environmental
entities, and worldly things and people, and they also repre-
sent odors. In fact, they represent the environmental entities by
representing odors. By smelling a certain familiar odor I also
smell—veridically or not—an actual rose or roasting lamb or my
least favorite aunt.
Let me back up. The present sort of issue has long since been
encountered in the philosophy of vision24. In that literature, there
are conservative positions (vision itself represents only colors
and shapes), very liberal positions in the tradition of Hansen
and Kuhn (suitably trained and informed vision can represent
practically anything), intermediate positions (vision can repre-
sent natural kinds and causal relations, but not expensiveness or
uninhabitedness or uninhibitedness or global warming or an eco-
nomic downturn)—and layering positions, according to which
visual states have multiple intentional objects and we see more
abstract and worldly things in and by seeing simpler and more
primitive ones.
Here are some of the layering views. Peacocke (1992):
We represent indexical “scenario” content; low-level proper-
ties (non-conceptual); and high-level properties; it is, I think
Peacocke meant, the same vehicle that does both representings.
24For summaries, see Siegel (2010) and Lycan (2014).
Lycan (1996): We represent high-level properties by represent-
ing scenario content and low-level properties of external objects.
The model here is that of deferred ostension: Pointing at a chalk
mark on a blackboard, we refer to a numeral; thereby we refer
to a number; thereby we refer to an office in Emerson Hall; and
thereby we refer to its occupant, a person. Noë (2004): We per-
ceive high-level properties, though only as “present as absent,”
by actually-perceiving “perspectival properties” (=“appearance
properties”) of external objects. Schellenberg (2008): We perceive
“situation-dependent” properties of external objects, and thereby
the high-level properties of the same objects, the perception of the
latter depending epistemically on that of the former. (It is impor-
tant to grasp that the situation-dependent features are perfectly
real and mind-independent.)
Returning to my original argument against the idea that the
rose smell represents roses: It was essentially that if I expe-
rience the rose smell when the rose odor is present but no
actual rose is, I am smelling correctly, and if I experience the
smell when an odorless rose is present, I am not smelling cor-
rectly. But in the face of my own layering view for the case
of vision, this argument is too simple. For that view intro-
duces the possibility that a mental representation can have more
than one truth value at once. And indeed, I think it is fairly
plausible to say that in the first case—that of experiencing
the rose smell in the absence of any rose—I am represent-
ing both correctly and incorrectly, the odor correctly and roses
incorrectly.
My suggestion, then, is that a given sensory state typically has,
not just a single intentional object, but two ormore arranged hier-
archically by the “by” relation. As before, a good model here is
that of deferred linguistic reference.
But there are problems. The first is the above-noted objection
thatmy rose representation is only the result of unconscious infer-
ence from the lower-layered olfactory representation rather than
being olfactory itself, especially since the “rose” response seems to
depend on acquired empirical association. That objection is not
decisive, but it is serious25.
My (1996) layering view depended on a visual ontology of
“shapes,” some of which items are real physical objects but most
are non-actual. Whether or not one can abide that ontology, it has
no obvious analog for smell, because the notion of a “shape” was
motivated by visuocentric considerations of size, direction, dis-
tance, and surface. I have given up my (1996) position in favor
of Schellenberg’s superior layering view. But (second problem)
it is far from obvious that her “situation-dependent” proper-
ties have olfactory analogs, either. Situation-dependent properties
are, she says, “(nonconstant) functions of the intrinsic properties
25Philosophy has not entirely resolved the general question of whether the
incredibly busy pre-processing that goes on in our perceptual modules should
be counted as un- (because pre-)conscious inference—or how modular the
modules are to begin with, given what is now called “cognitive penetrability”
(Macpherson, 2012); on these matters, see Lycan (2014). For now: Even if my
rose representation is the result of unconscious inference in one sense, that
does not disprove the claim that it is also itself olfactory. A reviewer has further
suggested that the mechanism connecting the rose odor to the rose is, rather,
cross-modal binding.
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of the object and the situational features” (p. 60). The cup on the
table has
one side closer [to me] than the other; one part faces away from
me. Its shape is presented in an egocentric frame of reference,
which in turn means that the object and its parts are presented
as standing in specific spatial relations to me. The way the cup
is presented to a location is on the suggested view an exter-
nal and mind-independent, albeit situation-dependent property
of the world. Any perceiver occupying the same location would,
ceteris paribus, be presented with the cup in the very same way.
(p. 61)
Schellenberg says similar things about color: The relational prop-
erties of an external object that make it appear colored to us as
it does in this setting and lighting conditions are, tautologously,
properties of the object.
Do objects have mind-independent, situation-dependent odor
properties? Obviously roses have relational properties which
cause them to smell as they do to us. But I do not offhand see
that simply by detecting those properties we detect roses without
benefit of background knowledge. Perhaps I am wrong.
(11) I believe that I together with others have made it very
plausible that smell represents, and I have defended roughly my
original view of what it represents first and foremost. I would
still like to accommodate Millikan and common parlance in the
matter of ecodistality, through layering. But I of all people cannot
assume that a view that is plausible for vision will extrapolate to
any other sense modality.
REFERENCES
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). AMaterialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Armstrong, D. M. (1984). “Consciousness and causality,” in Consciousness and
Causality, eds D. M. Armstrong and N. Malcolm (Oxford: Blackwell), 103–191.
Armstrong, D. M. (1987). “Smart and the secondary qualities,” inMetaphysics and
Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, eds P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman
(Oxford: Blackwell), 1–15.
Batty, C. (2014). The illusion confusion. Front. Psychol. 5:231. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00231
Batty, C. (2010). A representational account of olfactory experience. Can. J. Philos.
40, 511–538. doi: 10.1353/cjp.2010.0020
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philos. Rev. 110, 199–239. doi:
10.1215/00318108-110-2-199
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001
Chisholm, R. (1976). Person and Object. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Clark, A. (1993). Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2000). A Theory of Sentience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238515.001.0001
Crane, T. (2003). “The intentional structure of consciousness,” in Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives, eds Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 33–56.
Hill, C. S. (2005). “Ow! The paradox of pain,” in Pain: New Essays on its Nature
and the Methodology of its Study, ed M. Aydede (Cambridge, MA: Bradford
Books/MIT Press), 75–98.
Jackson, F. (1977). Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, W. G. (1987). Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Lycan, W. G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: Bradford
Books/MIT Press.
Lycan, W. G. (1998). “In defense of the representational theory of qualia (replies
to Neander, Rey and Tye),” in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12: Language,
Mind and Ontology, ed J. Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing),
479–487.
Lycan, W. G. (2000). “Representational theories of consciousness,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (originally Summer 2000 Edition);
extensively revised and greatly expanded editions, 2004, 2006, 2014, ed E.
N. Zalta. Available online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-
representational
Lycan, W. G. (2003). “Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument,”
in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, eds Q. Smith and A. Jokic
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 384–395.
Lycan, W. G. (2004). “The superiority of HOP to HOT,” in Higher-Order Theories
of Consciousness, ed R. Gennaro (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins),
93–113. doi: 10.1075/aicr.56.07lyc
Lycan, W. G. (2014). “What does vision represent?,” in Does Perception
Have Content? ed B. Brogaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
311–328.
Macpherson, F. (2012). Cognitive penetration of colour experience: rethinking the
issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 84, 24–62. doi:
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00481.x
Majid, A., and Burenhult, N. (2014). Odors are expressible in language,
as long as you speak the right language. Cognition 130, 266–270. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.004
Matthen, M. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001
Millikan, R. G. (1989). Biosemantics. J. Philos. 86, 281–297. doi: 10.2307/2027123
Millikan, R. G. (1995). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.
Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Perkins, M. (1983). Sensing the World. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Pitcher, G. (1970). Pain perception. Philos. Rev. 79, 368–393. doi: 10.2307/2183934
Prinz, J. J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511597954
Richardson, L. (2013). Sniffing and smelling. Philos. Stud. 162, 401–419. doi:
10.1007/s11098-011-9774-6
Schellenberg, S. (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. J. Philos. 105,
55–85. doi: 10.5840/jphil200810525
Siegel, S. (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Smith, A. D. (2002). The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Stevenson, R. J. (2011). Olfactory illusions: where are they? Conscious. Cogn. 20,
1887–1898. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.05.011
Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Bradford
Books/MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2005). “Another look at representationalism about pain,” in Pain: New
Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, ed M. Aydede (Cambridge,
MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press), 99–120.
Wilson, D. A., and Stevenson, R. J. (2006). Learning to Smell: Olfactory Perception
from Neurobiology to Behavior. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Young, B. (2013). The Molecular Structure of Smells. MS, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 03 October 2013; accepted: 24 April 2014; published online: 27 May 2014.
Citation: Lycan WG (2014) The intentionality of smell. Front. Psychol. 5:436. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00436
This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Lycan. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 436 | 8
